"intensionally" meaning in English

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      "word": "extensionally"
    }
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        "1": "en",
        "2": "intensional",
        "3": "ly"
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      "expansion": "intensional + -ly",
      "name": "suf"
    }
  ],
  "etymology_text": "From intensional + -ly.",
  "forms": [
    {
      "form": "more intensionally",
      "tags": [
        "comparative"
      ]
    },
    {
      "form": "most intensionally",
      "tags": [
        "superlative"
      ]
    }
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  "head_templates": [
    {
      "args": {},
      "expansion": "intensionally (comparative more intensionally, superlative most intensionally)",
      "name": "en-adv"
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  ],
  "lang": "English",
  "lang_code": "en",
  "pos": "adv",
  "senses": [
    {
      "categories": [
        {
          "kind": "other",
          "name": "English entries with incorrect language header",
          "parents": [
            "Entries with incorrect language header",
            "Entry maintenance"
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          "source": "w"
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          "name": "English terms suffixed with -ly",
          "parents": [],
          "source": "w"
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        {
          "kind": "topical",
          "langcode": "en",
          "name": "Philosophy",
          "orig": "en:Philosophy",
          "parents": [
            "All topics",
            "Fundamental"
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        }
      ],
      "examples": [
        {
          "ref": "2008 August 13, Jonathan Schaffer, “Truthmaker commitments”, in Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, →DOI:",
          "text": "Indeed the whole point of Aristotle’s example of truth depending on being was that the truth of the proposition and the existence of the man are intensionally equivalent, yet there is an asymmetry of dependence.",
          "type": "quote"
        },
        {
          "ref": "2011 July 20, Edwin Mares, “Propositional Function”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, retrieved 2012-07-15:",
          "text": "A term is treated either extensionally as a class of objects or intensionally as a set of properties. The ‘intent’ of the term ‘dog’ includes all the properties that are included in the intent of ‘mammal’. The intensional treatment of ‘dogs are mammals’ interprets this sentence as true because the semantic interpretation of the subject is a superset of the interpretation of the predicate. On the extensional treatment of the sentence, however, the sentence is true because the interpretation of the subject (the class of dogs) is a subset of the interpretation of the predicate (the set of mammals).",
          "type": "quote"
        }
      ],
      "glosses": [
        "With respect to intension."
      ],
      "id": "en-intensionally-en-adv-dDml4q1r",
      "links": [
        [
          "philosophy",
          "philosophy"
        ],
        [
          "intension",
          "intension"
        ]
      ],
      "raw_glosses": [
        "(philosophy) With respect to intension."
      ],
      "related": [
        {
          "word": "intensional"
        },
        {
          "word": "intensionality"
        }
      ],
      "topics": [
        "human-sciences",
        "philosophy",
        "sciences"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "word": "intensionally"
}

{
  "antonyms": [
    {
      "word": "extensionally"
    }
  ],
  "etymology_templates": [
    {
      "args": {
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        "2": "intensional",
        "3": "ly"
      },
      "expansion": "intensional + -ly",
      "name": "suf"
    }
  ],
  "etymology_text": "From intensional + -ly.",
  "forms": [
    {
      "form": "more intensionally",
      "tags": [
        "comparative"
      ]
    },
    {
      "form": "most intensionally",
      "tags": [
        "superlative"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "head_templates": [
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      "args": {},
      "expansion": "intensionally (comparative more intensionally, superlative most intensionally)",
      "name": "en-adv"
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  "lang": "English",
  "lang_code": "en",
  "pos": "adv",
  "related": [
    {
      "word": "intensional"
    },
    {
      "word": "intensionality"
    }
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      "examples": [
        {
          "ref": "2008 August 13, Jonathan Schaffer, “Truthmaker commitments”, in Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, →DOI:",
          "text": "Indeed the whole point of Aristotle’s example of truth depending on being was that the truth of the proposition and the existence of the man are intensionally equivalent, yet there is an asymmetry of dependence.",
          "type": "quote"
        },
        {
          "ref": "2011 July 20, Edwin Mares, “Propositional Function”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, retrieved 2012-07-15:",
          "text": "A term is treated either extensionally as a class of objects or intensionally as a set of properties. The ‘intent’ of the term ‘dog’ includes all the properties that are included in the intent of ‘mammal’. The intensional treatment of ‘dogs are mammals’ interprets this sentence as true because the semantic interpretation of the subject is a superset of the interpretation of the predicate. On the extensional treatment of the sentence, however, the sentence is true because the interpretation of the subject (the class of dogs) is a subset of the interpretation of the predicate (the set of mammals).",
          "type": "quote"
        }
      ],
      "glosses": [
        "With respect to intension."
      ],
      "links": [
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          "intension",
          "intension"
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        "(philosophy) With respect to intension."
      ],
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  "word": "intensionally"
}