"conativism" meaning in English

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  "etymology_text": "conative + -ism",
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  "lang_code": "en",
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          "ref": "1996, John Bricke, Mind and Morality: An Examination of Hume's Moral Psychology, page 81",
          "text": "And — the crucial point for present purposes — they enable Hume to drive home the conclusion that moral cognitivism's first, or psychological, claim must be rejected, and moral conativism endorsed, if one is to understand the tie between morality and action.",
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        {
          "ref": "2018, Stefan Fischer, The Origin of Oughtness: A Case for Metaethical Conativism, page 248",
          "text": "We have spent the last couple of chapters working out the core features of conativism: the nature of desiring and promotion, the issue of idealization, the nature of practical reasons, and an account of the weight of favorings.",
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        {
          "ref": "2018, Joel Marks, The Ways of Desire",
          "text": "The argument against desire which was presented in the preceding section only addresses strong conativism.",
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        "The belief that the basis of all action lies in desire."
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        "(philosophy) The belief that the basis of all action lies in desire."
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          "word": "conativist"
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  "word": "conativism"
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  "etymology_text": "conative + -ism",
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  "lang_code": "en",
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      "word": "conativist"
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          "ref": "2018, Stefan Fischer, The Origin of Oughtness: A Case for Metaethical Conativism, page 248",
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          "text": "The argument against desire which was presented in the preceding section only addresses strong conativism.",
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        "The belief that the basis of all action lies in desire."
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        "(philosophy) The belief that the basis of all action lies in desire."
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