"adverbialism" meaning in English

{
  "etymology_templates": [
    {
      "args": {
        "1": "en",
        "2": "adverbial",
        "3": "ism"
      },
      "expansion": "adverbial + -ism",
      "name": "suffix"
    }
  ],
  "etymology_text": "adverbial + -ism",
  "head_templates": [
    {
      "args": {
        "1": "-"
      },
      "expansion": "adverbialism (uncountable)",
      "name": "en-noun"
    }
  ],
  "lang": "English",
  "lang_code": "en",
  "pos": "noun",
  "senses": [
    {
      "categories": [
        {
          "kind": "other",
          "name": "English entries with incorrect language header",
          "parents": [
            "Entries with incorrect language header",
            "Entry maintenance"
          ],
          "source": "w"
        },
        {
          "kind": "other",
          "name": "English entries with language name categories using raw markup",
          "parents": [
            "Entries with language name categories using raw markup",
            "Entry maintenance"
          ],
          "source": "w"
        },
        {
          "kind": "other",
          "name": "English terms suffixed with -ism",
          "parents": [],
          "source": "w"
        },
        {
          "kind": "topical",
          "langcode": "en",
          "name": "Philosophy",
          "orig": "en:Philosophy",
          "parents": [
            "All topics",
            "Fundamental"
          ],
          "source": "w"
        }
      ],
      "examples": [
        {
          "ref": "2008 August 5, Uriah Kriegel, “The dispensability of (merely) intentional objects”, in Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, →DOI",
          "text": "I have considered a number of objections to adverbialism being true.",
          "type": "quotation"
        }
      ],
      "glosses": [
        "The view that perceptions do not have objects, so for example one \"senses redly\" rather than being aware of a red sense datum."
      ],
      "id": "en-adverbialism-en-noun-TXrD9FQh",
      "links": [
        [
          "philosophy",
          "philosophy"
        ],
        [
          "view",
          "view"
        ],
        [
          "perception",
          "perception"
        ],
        [
          "object",
          "object"
        ],
        [
          "datum",
          "datum"
        ]
      ],
      "raw_glosses": [
        "(philosophy) The view that perceptions do not have objects, so for example one \"senses redly\" rather than being aware of a red sense datum."
      ],
      "tags": [
        "uncountable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "human-sciences",
        "philosophy",
        "sciences"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "word": "adverbialism"
}

{
  "etymology_templates": [
    {
      "args": {
        "1": "en",
        "2": "adverbial",
        "3": "ism"
      },
      "expansion": "adverbial + -ism",
      "name": "suffix"
    }
  ],
  "etymology_text": "adverbial + -ism",
  "head_templates": [
    {
      "args": {
        "1": "-"
      },
      "expansion": "adverbialism (uncountable)",
      "name": "en-noun"
    }
  ],
  "lang": "English",
  "lang_code": "en",
  "pos": "noun",
  "senses": [
    {
      "categories": [
        "English entries with incorrect language header",
        "English entries with language name categories using raw markup",
        "English hybridisms suffixed with -ism",
        "English lemmas",
        "English nouns",
        "English terms suffixed with -ism",
        "English terms with quotations",
        "English uncountable nouns",
        "en:Philosophy"
      ],
      "examples": [
        {
          "ref": "2008 August 5, Uriah Kriegel, “The dispensability of (merely) intentional objects”, in Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, →DOI",
          "text": "I have considered a number of objections to adverbialism being true.",
          "type": "quotation"
        }
      ],
      "glosses": [
        "The view that perceptions do not have objects, so for example one \"senses redly\" rather than being aware of a red sense datum."
      ],
      "links": [
        [
          "philosophy",
          "philosophy"
        ],
        [
          "view",
          "view"
        ],
        [
          "perception",
          "perception"
        ],
        [
          "object",
          "object"
        ],
        [
          "datum",
          "datum"
        ]
      ],
      "raw_glosses": [
        "(philosophy) The view that perceptions do not have objects, so for example one \"senses redly\" rather than being aware of a red sense datum."
      ],
      "tags": [
        "uncountable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "human-sciences",
        "philosophy",
        "sciences"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "word": "adverbialism"
}