"property-theoretic" meaning in All languages combined

{
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      "expansion": "property-theoretic (not comparable)",
      "name": "en-adj"
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  ],
  "lang": "English",
  "lang_code": "en",
  "pos": "adj",
  "senses": [
    {
      "categories": [
        {
          "kind": "other",
          "name": "English entries with incorrect language header",
          "parents": [
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          "source": "w"
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        {
          "kind": "topical",
          "langcode": "en",
          "name": "Philosophy",
          "orig": "en:Philosophy",
          "parents": [
            "All topics",
            "Fundamental"
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          "source": "w"
        }
      ],
      "examples": [
        {
          "ref": "2008, Hartry Field, Saving Truth from Paradox",
          "text": "Kurt Gödel is reported to have remarked ‘‘There never were any set-theoretic paradoxes, but the property-theoretic paradoxes are still unresolved.’’ The idea behind the first part of his remark is presumably that the notion of set was hierarchical from the start, so that it should have been obvious all along that there was no Russell set (in the mathematical sense of ‘set’). The idea behind the second part is that this obvious resolution of Russell’s ‘‘paradox’’ for sets simply doesn’t carry over to the paradox for properties.",
          "type": "quotation"
        }
      ],
      "glosses": [
        "Of or pertaining to the theory of properties."
      ],
      "id": "en-property-theoretic-en-adj-K7P4HcCQ",
      "links": [
        [
          "philosophy",
          "philosophy"
        ],
        [
          "theory of properties",
          "theory of properties"
        ]
      ],
      "raw_glosses": [
        "(philosophy) Of or pertaining to the theory of properties."
      ],
      "tags": [
        "not-comparable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "human-sciences",
        "philosophy",
        "sciences"
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  "word": "property-theoretic"
}

{
  "head_templates": [
    {
      "args": {
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      "expansion": "property-theoretic (not comparable)",
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  "lang": "English",
  "lang_code": "en",
  "pos": "adj",
  "senses": [
    {
      "categories": [
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        "English lemmas",
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        "English terms with quotations",
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        "Quotation templates to be cleaned",
        "en:Philosophy"
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      "examples": [
        {
          "ref": "2008, Hartry Field, Saving Truth from Paradox",
          "text": "Kurt Gödel is reported to have remarked ‘‘There never were any set-theoretic paradoxes, but the property-theoretic paradoxes are still unresolved.’’ The idea behind the first part of his remark is presumably that the notion of set was hierarchical from the start, so that it should have been obvious all along that there was no Russell set (in the mathematical sense of ‘set’). The idea behind the second part is that this obvious resolution of Russell’s ‘‘paradox’’ for sets simply doesn’t carry over to the paradox for properties.",
          "type": "quotation"
        }
      ],
      "glosses": [
        "Of or pertaining to the theory of properties."
      ],
      "links": [
        [
          "philosophy",
          "philosophy"
        ],
        [
          "theory of properties",
          "theory of properties"
        ]
      ],
      "raw_glosses": [
        "(philosophy) Of or pertaining to the theory of properties."
      ],
      "tags": [
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  "word": "property-theoretic"
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