See phænomenally in All languages combined, or Wiktionary
Download JSONL data for phænomenally meaning in Inglés (5.6kB)
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"name": "etimología"
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"etymology_text": "De phænomenal y el sufijo -ly.",
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"pronunciación": "falta agregar"
},
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{
"form": "phænomenally",
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"form": "more phænomenally most phænomenally",
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"1": "An object is presented to our observation which has phænomenally begun to be.",
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"url": "http://books.google.com/books?id=KaYtpaf3trsC&hl=es&pg=PA621"
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"text": "An object is presented to our observation which has phænomenally begun to be."
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"1": "The Cosmos, in the scheme of the Constructive idealists, grapples the Absolute, if we may so say, by one available anchor (Mind seeking its cause), and would grapple it by another if it knew where to find that other (the unknown external cause of sensation, for which also, were it realized, a cause would have to be sought) ; the Cosmos, in the scheme of the Natural Realist, grapples the Absolute by two anchors, considered equally available—Mind, and that Material Nature which Mind knows face to face as phænomenally existing out of itself.",
"a": "David Masson",
"c": "libro",
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"t": "Recent British Philosophy",
"url": "http://books.google.com/books?id=j7gpAAAAYAAJ&hl=es&pg=PA137"
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"text": "The Cosmos, in the scheme of the Constructive idealists, grapples the Absolute, if we may so say, by one available anchor (Mind seeking its cause), and would grapple it by another if it knew where to find that other (the unknown external cause of sensation, for which also, were it realized, a cause would have to be sought) ; the Cosmos, in the scheme of the Natural Realist, grapples the Absolute by two anchors, considered equally available—Mind, and that Material Nature which Mind knows face to face as phænomenally existing out of itself."
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"1": "Having thus, as I hope, more clearly defined my position in regard to the reality of the Ego, considered as a question of Ontology, I return to my first starting point, the Relativity of human knowledge, and affirm (being here in entire accordance with Sir W. Hamilton) that whatever be the nature of the real existence we are compelled to acknowledge in Mind, the Mind is only known to itself phænomenally, as the series of its feelings or consciousnesses.",
"a": "John Stuart Mill",
"c": "libro",
"f": "1867",
"t": "An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy and of the Principal Philosophical Questions Discussed in His Writings",
"url": "http://books.google.com/books?id=q-U0AQAAIAAJ&hl=es&pg=PA257"
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"expansion": ":*Ejemplo:\n::Having thus, as I hope, more clearly defined my position in regard to the reality of the Ego, considered as a question of Ontology, I return to my first starting point, the Relativity of human knowledge, and affirm (being here in entire accordance with Sir W. Hamilton) that whatever be the nature of the real existence we are compelled to acknowledge in Mind, the Mind is only known to itself phænomenally, as the series of its feelings or consciousnesses.John Stuart Mill. An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy and of the Principal Philosophical Questions Discussed in His Writings. 1867.",
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"ref": "John Stuart Mill. An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy and of the Principal Philosophical Questions Discussed in His Writings. 1867.",
"text": "Having thus, as I hope, more clearly defined my position in regard to the reality of the Ego, considered as a question of Ontology, I return to my first starting point, the Relativity of human knowledge, and affirm (being here in entire accordance with Sir W. Hamilton) that whatever be the nature of the real existence we are compelled to acknowledge in Mind, the Mind is only known to itself phænomenally, as the series of its feelings or consciousnesses."
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"glosses": [
"Grafía obsoleta de phenomenally."
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"id": "es-phænomenally-en-adv-1",
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"word": "phænomenally"
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"name": "etimología"
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],
"etymology_text": "De phænomenal y el sufijo -ly.",
"extra_sounds": {
"pronunciación": "falta agregar"
},
"forms": [
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"form": "phænomenally",
"tags": [
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"text": "An object is presented to our observation which has phænomenally begun to be."
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"1": "The Cosmos, in the scheme of the Constructive idealists, grapples the Absolute, if we may so say, by one available anchor (Mind seeking its cause), and would grapple it by another if it knew where to find that other (the unknown external cause of sensation, for which also, were it realized, a cause would have to be sought) ; the Cosmos, in the scheme of the Natural Realist, grapples the Absolute by two anchors, considered equally available—Mind, and that Material Nature which Mind knows face to face as phænomenally existing out of itself.",
"a": "David Masson",
"c": "libro",
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"url": "http://books.google.com/books?id=j7gpAAAAYAAJ&hl=es&pg=PA137"
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"expansion": ":*Ejemplo:\n::The Cosmos, in the scheme of the Constructive idealists, grapples the Absolute, if we may so say, by one available anchor (Mind seeking its cause), and would grapple it by another if it knew where to find that other (the unknown external cause of sensation, for which also, were it realized, a cause would have to be sought) ; the Cosmos, in the scheme of the Natural Realist, grapples the Absolute by two anchors, considered equally available—Mind, and that Material Nature which Mind knows face to face as phænomenally existing out of itself.David Masson. Recent British Philosophy. 1866.",
"name": "ejemplo"
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"text": "The Cosmos, in the scheme of the Constructive idealists, grapples the Absolute, if we may so say, by one available anchor (Mind seeking its cause), and would grapple it by another if it knew where to find that other (the unknown external cause of sensation, for which also, were it realized, a cause would have to be sought) ; the Cosmos, in the scheme of the Natural Realist, grapples the Absolute by two anchors, considered equally available—Mind, and that Material Nature which Mind knows face to face as phænomenally existing out of itself."
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"1": "Having thus, as I hope, more clearly defined my position in regard to the reality of the Ego, considered as a question of Ontology, I return to my first starting point, the Relativity of human knowledge, and affirm (being here in entire accordance with Sir W. Hamilton) that whatever be the nature of the real existence we are compelled to acknowledge in Mind, the Mind is only known to itself phænomenally, as the series of its feelings or consciousnesses.",
"a": "John Stuart Mill",
"c": "libro",
"f": "1867",
"t": "An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy and of the Principal Philosophical Questions Discussed in His Writings",
"url": "http://books.google.com/books?id=q-U0AQAAIAAJ&hl=es&pg=PA257"
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"expansion": ":*Ejemplo:\n::Having thus, as I hope, more clearly defined my position in regard to the reality of the Ego, considered as a question of Ontology, I return to my first starting point, the Relativity of human knowledge, and affirm (being here in entire accordance with Sir W. Hamilton) that whatever be the nature of the real existence we are compelled to acknowledge in Mind, the Mind is only known to itself phænomenally, as the series of its feelings or consciousnesses.John Stuart Mill. An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy and of the Principal Philosophical Questions Discussed in His Writings. 1867.",
"name": "ejemplo"
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"ref": "John Stuart Mill. An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy and of the Principal Philosophical Questions Discussed in His Writings. 1867.",
"text": "Having thus, as I hope, more clearly defined my position in regard to the reality of the Ego, considered as a question of Ontology, I return to my first starting point, the Relativity of human knowledge, and affirm (being here in entire accordance with Sir W. Hamilton) that whatever be the nature of the real existence we are compelled to acknowledge in Mind, the Mind is only known to itself phænomenally, as the series of its feelings or consciousnesses."
}
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"glosses": [
"Grafía obsoleta de phenomenally."
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"word": "phænomenally"
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