"evaluativism" meaning in English

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      "word": "factualism"
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  "etymology_text": "From evaluative + -ism.",
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  "lang": "English",
  "lang_code": "en",
  "pos": "noun",
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      "derived": [
        {
          "word": "evaluativist"
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      "examples": [
        {
          "ref": "1989, Raymond Martin, The Past Within Us: An Empirical Approach to Philosophy of History, Princeton University Press, page 97",
          "text": "Most who have argued for evaluativism have been interested in establishing skepticism, and have assumed that evaluativism implied skepticism.",
          "type": "quotation"
        },
        {
          "ref": "2007, Stathis Psillos, “Putting a Bridle on Irrationality: An Appraisal of van Fraassen's New Epistemology”, in Bradley Monton, editor, Images of empiricism: essays on science and stances, Oxford University Press, page 154",
          "text": "[E]valutivism makes plain that any attempt to justify a rule (ultimately by a rule-circular argument) will be an attempt for rules we value and will depend on rules we value (our basic inferential rules).",
          "type": "quotation"
        },
        {
          "ref": "2008, Carrie S Jenkins, Grounding Concepts: An Empirical Basis for Arithmetical Knowledge: An Empirical Basis for Arithmetical Knowledge, Oxford University Press, page 68",
          "text": "There is prima facie something deeply unappealing about evaluativism: our intuitions rebel at the suggestion that reasonableness is 'not a factual property' and that '[i]n calling a rule reasonable we are evaluating it, and all that makes sense to ask about is what we value'.",
          "type": "quotation"
        }
      ],
      "glosses": [
        "The belief that certain disagreements (even about facts) ultimately stem from differing values, and therefore cannot be resolved as factual disagreements."
      ],
      "id": "en-evaluativism-en-noun-Ji6ZNFKZ",
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        "(epistemology) The belief that certain disagreements (even about facts) ultimately stem from differing values, and therefore cannot be resolved as factual disagreements."
      ],
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  "word": "evaluativism"
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      "word": "factualism"
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  "derived": [
    {
      "word": "evaluativist"
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  ],
  "etymology_text": "From evaluative + -ism.",
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          "ref": "1989, Raymond Martin, The Past Within Us: An Empirical Approach to Philosophy of History, Princeton University Press, page 97",
          "text": "Most who have argued for evaluativism have been interested in establishing skepticism, and have assumed that evaluativism implied skepticism.",
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          "ref": "2007, Stathis Psillos, “Putting a Bridle on Irrationality: An Appraisal of van Fraassen's New Epistemology”, in Bradley Monton, editor, Images of empiricism: essays on science and stances, Oxford University Press, page 154",
          "text": "[E]valutivism makes plain that any attempt to justify a rule (ultimately by a rule-circular argument) will be an attempt for rules we value and will depend on rules we value (our basic inferential rules).",
          "type": "quotation"
        },
        {
          "ref": "2008, Carrie S Jenkins, Grounding Concepts: An Empirical Basis for Arithmetical Knowledge: An Empirical Basis for Arithmetical Knowledge, Oxford University Press, page 68",
          "text": "There is prima facie something deeply unappealing about evaluativism: our intuitions rebel at the suggestion that reasonableness is 'not a factual property' and that '[i]n calling a rule reasonable we are evaluating it, and all that makes sense to ask about is what we value'.",
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        "The belief that certain disagreements (even about facts) ultimately stem from differing values, and therefore cannot be resolved as factual disagreements."
      ],
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        "(epistemology) The belief that certain disagreements (even about facts) ultimately stem from differing values, and therefore cannot be resolved as factual disagreements."
      ],
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  "word": "evaluativism"
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