"subdoxastic" meaning in All languages combined

{
  "etymology_templates": [
    {
      "args": {
        "1": "en",
        "2": "sub",
        "3": "doxastic"
      },
      "expansion": "sub- + doxastic",
      "name": "prefix"
    }
  ],
  "etymology_text": "From sub- + doxastic.",
  "head_templates": [
    {
      "args": {
        "1": "-"
      },
      "expansion": "subdoxastic (not comparable)",
      "name": "en-adj"
    }
  ],
  "lang": "English",
  "lang_code": "en",
  "pos": "adj",
  "senses": [
    {
      "categories": [
        {
          "kind": "other",
          "name": "English entries with incorrect language header",
          "parents": [
            "Entries with incorrect language header",
            "Entry maintenance"
          ],
          "source": "w"
        },
        {
          "kind": "other",
          "name": "English terms prefixed with sub-",
          "parents": [],
          "source": "w"
        },
        {
          "kind": "other",
          "name": "Pages with 1 entry",
          "parents": [],
          "source": "w"
        },
        {
          "kind": "other",
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        }
      ],
      "examples": [
        {
          "ref": "2008 January 30, Lisa Warenski, “Naturalism, fallibilism, and the a priori”, in Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3:",
          "text": "And to the extent we understand what an empirical justification is, we can contrast it with a non-empirical justification or a justification that is constituted by the operations of reason (or subdoxastic reasoning processes) upon previously-acquired concepts.",
          "type": "quote"
        },
        {
          "ref": "2008 September 12, Hamid Vahid, “Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3:",
          "text": "But this does not square well with Reynolds' explanation of the way we arrive at our justified beliefs in terms of sub-skills that involve rule-governed subdoxastic processes and states whose contents are, by definition, not phenomenologically salient.",
          "type": "quote"
        }
      ],
      "glosses": [
        "Of or pertaining to what underlies the formation of beliefs or opinions."
      ],
      "id": "en-subdoxastic-en-adj-H5yaCmvj",
      "links": [
        [
          "underlie",
          "underlie"
        ],
        [
          "belief",
          "belief"
        ],
        [
          "opinion",
          "opinion"
        ]
      ],
      "tags": [
        "not-comparable"
      ],
      "wikipedia": [
        "Doxastic logic"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "word": "subdoxastic"
}

{
  "etymology_templates": [
    {
      "args": {
        "1": "en",
        "2": "sub",
        "3": "doxastic"
      },
      "expansion": "sub- + doxastic",
      "name": "prefix"
    }
  ],
  "etymology_text": "From sub- + doxastic.",
  "head_templates": [
    {
      "args": {
        "1": "-"
      },
      "expansion": "subdoxastic (not comparable)",
      "name": "en-adj"
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  ],
  "lang": "English",
  "lang_code": "en",
  "pos": "adj",
  "senses": [
    {
      "categories": [
        "English adjectives",
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        "English uncomparable adjectives",
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      "examples": [
        {
          "ref": "2008 January 30, Lisa Warenski, “Naturalism, fallibilism, and the a priori”, in Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3:",
          "text": "And to the extent we understand what an empirical justification is, we can contrast it with a non-empirical justification or a justification that is constituted by the operations of reason (or subdoxastic reasoning processes) upon previously-acquired concepts.",
          "type": "quote"
        },
        {
          "ref": "2008 September 12, Hamid Vahid, “Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3:",
          "text": "But this does not square well with Reynolds' explanation of the way we arrive at our justified beliefs in terms of sub-skills that involve rule-governed subdoxastic processes and states whose contents are, by definition, not phenomenologically salient.",
          "type": "quote"
        }
      ],
      "glosses": [
        "Of or pertaining to what underlies the formation of beliefs or opinions."
      ],
      "links": [
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          "underlie",
          "underlie"
        ],
        [
          "belief",
          "belief"
        ],
        [
          "opinion",
          "opinion"
        ]
      ],
      "tags": [
        "not-comparable"
      ],
      "wikipedia": [
        "Doxastic logic"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "word": "subdoxastic"
}