"brute-fact" meaning in All languages combined

{
  "head_templates": [
    {
      "args": {
        "1": "-"
      },
      "expansion": "brute-fact (not comparable)",
      "name": "en-adj"
    }
  ],
  "lang": "English",
  "lang_code": "en",
  "pos": "adj",
  "senses": [
    {
      "categories": [
        {
          "kind": "other",
          "name": "English entries with incorrect language header",
          "parents": [
            "Entries with incorrect language header",
            "Entry maintenance"
          ],
          "source": "w"
        },
        {
          "kind": "other",
          "name": "Pages with 1 entry",
          "parents": [],
          "source": "w"
        },
        {
          "kind": "other",
          "name": "Pages with entries",
          "parents": [],
          "source": "w"
        }
      ],
      "examples": [
        {
          "ref": "1982: Nicholas Rescher [ed.], American Philosophical Quarterly, volume 19, page 215 (Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh)",
          "text": "The fact that we can agree about veridical perceptions with others possessing similar conceptual schemas is strong evidence that the brute-fact features of our perceptual experience have an important correlation with a certain given […]"
        },
        {
          "ref": "2008: Adrian Haddock [ed.] and Fiona Macpherson [ed.], Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, page 220 (Oxford University Press; →ISBN, 9780199231546)",
          "text": "I’ll call the third proposal for what grounds the Positive Epistemic Fact the brute-fact proposal, because it gives the Positive Epistemic Fact the status of brute fact."
        }
      ],
      "glosses": [
        "brute fact (when used attributively)"
      ],
      "id": "en-brute-fact-en-adj-POnrZSVO",
      "links": [
        [
          "brute fact",
          "brute fact"
        ],
        [
          "attributive",
          "attributive"
        ]
      ],
      "tags": [
        "not-comparable"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "word": "brute-fact"
}

{
  "head_templates": [
    {
      "args": {
        "1": "-"
      },
      "expansion": "brute-fact (not comparable)",
      "name": "en-adj"
    }
  ],
  "lang": "English",
  "lang_code": "en",
  "pos": "adj",
  "senses": [
    {
      "categories": [
        "English adjectives",
        "English entries with incorrect language header",
        "English lemmas",
        "English multiword terms",
        "English uncomparable adjectives",
        "Pages with 1 entry",
        "Pages with entries"
      ],
      "examples": [
        {
          "ref": "1982: Nicholas Rescher [ed.], American Philosophical Quarterly, volume 19, page 215 (Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh)",
          "text": "The fact that we can agree about veridical perceptions with others possessing similar conceptual schemas is strong evidence that the brute-fact features of our perceptual experience have an important correlation with a certain given […]"
        },
        {
          "ref": "2008: Adrian Haddock [ed.] and Fiona Macpherson [ed.], Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, page 220 (Oxford University Press; →ISBN, 9780199231546)",
          "text": "I’ll call the third proposal for what grounds the Positive Epistemic Fact the brute-fact proposal, because it gives the Positive Epistemic Fact the status of brute fact."
        }
      ],
      "glosses": [
        "brute fact (when used attributively)"
      ],
      "links": [
        [
          "brute fact",
          "brute fact"
        ],
        [
          "attributive",
          "attributive"
        ]
      ],
      "tags": [
        "not-comparable"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "word": "brute-fact"
}